Werner's Cullen's Keats'

Example of blur - 'de-range'

I was reading Maximilian Werner’s essay Countee Cullen's Lyric Ghosts about Harlem Renaissance poet Countee Cullen (1903 – 1946) and his use of Keats, when I came across some joyous prior art, a good example of the blur.

But just as Cullen’s use of apostrophe was found to diverge from its conventional definition and application, so too do his words “merely” and “derange.” Merely at first seems to denote “only as specified, and nothing more; simply.” Etymologically, however, merely comes from the Latin merus, which means “not mixed” or “pure,” a meaning that underscores spring’s ability to “mix” and thereby undermine the distinction between seemingly disparate ideas.
While the word “derange” usually has a negative denotation, when we look at the etymological meaning of the word’s prefix we see that the word is also compatible with the merging described thus far. For the Latinate prefix de­ can possess the sense of “undoing” or “reversing,” while the word “range” means “to divide into classes or classify.” When combined, the etymological sense of “derange” is “undoing or reversing classification,” which is precisely what Cullen has done by presenting us with the extraordinary affinity between the speaker and Keats, not to mention ourselves.

The deranging work here of the poets, their making, unclasses the prepositions of language based on the place of speaker, or hearer. (So lately reified into pronouns.)

"The speaker and Keats, not to mention ourselves." become their affinity.

This is an example of the blur I go on about. (I’ve not considered it as an emotion but it is. Nor as a mere purity, or at least, as unpollute-able, beyond the edge cases that every social ontology must step in. I’ll leave that thought or two for another day.)

This derangement and the blur are similar as both labour intentionally to do the unclassing the ordinary day requires. Unclassing allows one to, perhaps, see the frame, or at least notice the work that goes into making the frame, a labour history of the effort 'we' make in hope that errors allow for a remedy in the hindsight of logic. The history of effort we call survival using the efficiencies of our things, all neat and tidy.

Our ontologies are always the result of choice. You can deconstruct them, but without the notion of choice you will end up with a textmachine, (latterly algorithmed as Large Language Models). In the textmachines of our rituals and prayers, in the forgetfulness of habit and thoughts, we begin to think, for example, that pronouns are not prepositions locating speakers and their hearers. A lot of reification, and even deification, begins in the routines that humdrum our days; ritual but not special, sacred but not mindful. And the dregs of which are upcycled as uniforms and identities and other lazy divinities.

Me, you, the king and I, my special word with god. Blur.

When a word is new one cannot define it, one can only use it. Meaning follows the use.

Discussion of de-range for framing the blur

There is an ancient and venerable tradition of calling for clarity in discussion, and even in argument, by way of making sure the parties to the discussion have some sense, or sensation, of the definite definition of the terms being bantered. Generally this does not extend to all words used in the bickering, but to those under most tension at any one time, or mode, or fashion.

It is felt, with good reason, that if we pay attention to our terms then our differences may not be as great as feared, and, importantly (worldingly so) that we will stop talking past each other. Not that we will stop projecting demons where there are really angels so much, for it  it is hoped, as not projecting at all.

A side quest, or rabbit hole, for this advice on definition, is the past definition of words which is a whole other taphonomical method, and which can end up in the etymological fallacy if we are not careful, but this is usually a result of the grammarian bias. Grammarians usually don't care about change, or are against it, but in these argumentative moments historical origins also appear to them as unchanging. The trick with the etymological fallacy is to not throw out the baby with the bathwater.

As usual the real work is in the framework, either noticing one has one, or that even more importantly, frameworks have frameworks all the way down. So when we settled down to calmly discuss our differences, it is under a cloudburst of turbulence, on a fractalicity of splintering rocks crystalled into continents of sedimentary moments purpled down into a deep history. And our words rarely include that sense of taphonomy and intimations of deep time, even if we have always been here.

I would say, that we should look at the words when they are not under the most tension, we will uncover the meta-frameworks more easily. It might be best to occlude the bright shiny bits, like when we study the sun with the aid of a blind.

To do so does not necessarily require a clarity of purpose, objectives of mission, as these substitute in for outcomes, or common goals, in the name of peace, but in order to self about the world:

We all just want the same thing.

Sometimes, which a call for a definition of terms may not assume, is a reappraisal of our assumptions. Assumptions which we can call a framework when we are conscious of the work we do framing our disputations. In grand terms we can call this a worldview, but still consider it a partial thing, a bias.

When we are not conscious of all this, then a clarity of purpose, a definition of terms, may not help at all. Especially in any arena where polarised binarised two-faced items thing-off against each other, moving so slowly in our anxious ken, grinding our teeth down to our gums.

Here a calming blur may help. Where what we know (gnosticism) and what we feel (mysticism) can re-access their imperious claims. A suspension of judgement pulling us back from rash executions.

There 'the world' worlds, a view from nowhere everywheres that which we carry within about the without.

It allows purpose its place to make missteps, because the way through error leads to tomorrow. Mistakes are only wrong because of hope, it is hope that gives us our hindsight ahead of time, logic is its derivative.

The blur, the derangement, can make this clear.

Thanks Maximilian Werner for this example.

Crossposted on substack.com