Caso, Juan Manuel Rodríguez, and Ricardo Noguera Solano. “Biological and Cultural Evolution of Morality: The Delusion of Progress.” Revista de Filosofía Fundamental (2022): via academia.edu Web. 21 Aug. 2024.

A reaction below to a paper that came my way. I am working my way through a to-do list of them.

Abstract: Life evolves; it does not progress. Morality is transformed; it does not progress. These sentences summarize two ideas we have been developing on biological evolution and its relationship with the origin and transformations of morality within cultural evolution. Our argument stands in contrast to assertions supporting the idea of moral progress. In general terms, the objective of this essay is to argue in favor of the idea that the human being’s moral sense is an accidental and historical characteristic, developed through processes of biological and cultural evolution, and subject to a continuous process of diversification. Resulting from biological diversification, the phenomenon of morality increases its diversification within the various cultural spaces where the history of all the different human groups has taken place. Neither the biological nor the cultural process is exempt from historicity, divergence or an accidental nature and therefore cannot be considered progressive.

That opening “Life evolves; it does not progress.”

“To evolve” and “to progress” are quite different notions of change through time. Progress is a story we tell about what we can see, or about what is important to us. It’s is a story that has arisen in evolution, and is therefore suspect.

“Morality is transformed; it does not progress.”

Morality is another story that has arisen in parallel and linked to progress, that story of a pilgrim, that journey and it’s hazards, that happy ending. Life goes on of course.

“the objective of this essay is to argue in favor of the idea that the human being’s moral sense is an accidental and historical characteristic, developed through processes of biological and cultural evolution, and subject to a continuous process of diversification.”

I basically agree, not sure why the word ‘diversification’ takes over the abstract though. I would use the term complexification here I guess.

Note: Notions of progress and evolution arose in a similar time, such that each influenced the other, but they are not versions of each other so much as fairly close cousins. One could say that progress appears to over-ride a good evolution understanding when it presents a story of increasing ‘betterment’ in intelligence or in the classic presentation of wee little horses into steeds fit for a chariot. Much like the way we follow celebrities’ careers over the economic landscape of our own efforts and mis-steps as we world along together. No doubt this is also an outcome of the urge to should.

Now to read the paper, will it hint at any urge or merely refute/reject/redict ‘progress’ as a useful framework.

A cute quote from my journey of reading this paper:

“This has created the situation that when one talks about progress, one justifies a particular way of understanding it, a single path upon which all human beings must walk to reach a final point.”

[Marx/Engels, Herman, Huxley, Spencer, Jamieson, Kitcher, Singer, Evans] List of moral progress enthusiasts. This enthusiasm is the outcome of the moral urge which is strong in all of them (hope springs eternal).

‘Moral progress’ story-telling is a type of worlding.

We segue into cultural evolution. They dance around apparent progress with the phrase ‘continuous and divergent cultural transformations’ and then seek to give the happenstance of a shared big history, in which morality is a convergence within the diverse space of possibilities (given that shared history). Thus moral action cannot be ‘characterised’ by progress (because so much local shared-history differs). Progress cannot be justified as a wider story shared by us all.

[de Waal, Montiel-Castro & Martinez-Conteras, Barkow, Wilson] List of evolutionary framework enthusiasts.

The authors' position is different from an evolutionary current which lifts us up out of Darwinian evolution into a new phase of diversity (cultural/social/moral).

They state “In our view, an outline of ethics and morals that definitively includes evolutionary thought has not yet been achieved.”

And never will be, it is not necessary.

Then they slip into assumming moral/morality exists: “Understanding the phenomenon of morality, including its origin and evolutionary development, is part of discussion that is currently generating more spaces for multidisciplinary research and reflection, spaces where, for example, discussions on whether there is a universal morality can take place,”

I agree with Stephen Stich:

How Can We Specify the Boundaries of the Moral Domain?
We Can’t Because the Moral Domain Does Not Exist.¹

I guess by saying “phenomena of morality” there is an out here for them, as we can study things which do not 'exist' but are experienced. But why shold there be selection for this phantom.

Why do we moralise? What the evolutionary background for the urge that we end up doing things like moralising? Seeing progress where there is none? Or shoulding? Why do we should at all and make these errors? Or varieties?

…and the less visible and less well-understood interactions of the epigenetic phenomena that are shining a light on characteristics of human life, including the moral sense. For the reasons above, evolution should not be understood exclusively as Darwinism or as natural selection. Additionally, we argue that Darwinism and the preponderance of the idea of natural selection has so strengthened the notion of progress – biological, cultural, and moral – that it has provoked a marked bias that has impregnated evolutionary thinking in both biological and cultural fields in last two hundred years.

Yes, definitely a mistep.

And I do no mean the ‘Darwinism or not’ possibilities in evolution (complexification of pathways of selection is what evolution is all about afterall) nor the critique of the baleful influence of ‘progress’ on this complexification around us, but because they use the term ‘moral sense’, which is too restricted, like the moral urge I used a couple of years ago, before moving on the worldbuilding urge and then just plain worlding.

I mean I tend to agree with their outline where they critique ‘progress’ in discussions of evolutionary progress. It’s important to point this out, but from my POV it’s what-evs.

[Hume, Espinoza, Maupertuis, and Buffon. Lamarck. Meslier. D’Holbach. Voltaire. Cabanis, Rousseau.] List of progress enthusiasts/critiqers, admittedly it was a 'progressive' idea at the time. Reactionaries thought it was bad worlding, not that they could use that terminology.

We shouldn't be too harsh on the progress mob, porgressive or imperial. That is just what we do when we world and feel we should. We even world that shoulding onto worlding and shoulding. Meta-shoulding worlding and vice-versa. What a mess I do agree. Remember its the activation of our lives inthe world that is important. Evolution does not care about coherence or consistency in these derivative outcomes we feel are so important (morality/religion/progress/pure land buddhism).

'Progress' is a natural movement, we even do it laying out tarot cards. Progress is a riff on life's unfolding: maiden, mother, crone.

[Lyell, Darwin] Enthusiasts of less direction but some achievement.

Darwin held that the root of morality was to be found in social life.

So how to we do ‘social-life’. That’s worlding, there is an urge hereabouts as strong as bodying. Worlding is a move/adaption which seeks to make/do/build/grow an extended phentoype as much as we grow a body. To live in the world is to compose ourselves, each and all, every and one.

Finally get to empathy at page 111.

Then we get side-walloped by a discussion about memes and cultural transmission, which are also outcomes of worlding urge… —we do not have an instinct for fashion, we have an urge for that worlding interaction in which things change with the seasons, and conditions, and life events, where we exchange POV, information, frameworks, routines, rites, and eventually, goods, tokens of esteem, and from which the temple and the market arise, in sacred spaces and commodious trade.

The meme thing is a side-track much like ‘progress’ itself.

[Gould] and so we get the word complexification on page 115. That is a win. I guess my position is very Gouldian, but none of that magisteria malarky.

More hand-waving about diversity.

‘Progress’ as power-dressing (the imperial form of worlding that the wise cogniscenti know about and so warn us— it is still worlding though.).

[Buddhism. Kant, Hume.]

Trees of life versus progress.

Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb’s (2015) four inheritance systems --- if you blur that all up together you get the self/worlding ratio/s, which as a phenomena you can use to produce ‘things’ like morality/moral sense/shoulding/worlding.

Final reaction:

I basically agree with them and find the article a good introduction to this discussion, but they do not make the leap from diversity and complexification to realising that morality, just like progress itself is an outcome of a process that does not judge the outcome (the product) but whether the effort helps one survive, especially with and among others.

Finding any selective framework for such a disjunct is not possible.

Thus focussing on ‘morality’ or 'religion' or 'art' or 'trade' or ‘progress’ is a mistep.

There is no moral sense, but we do have an urge to should one into place. That is a disjunct, and BTW saying 'diversity' really loudly may deafen you to what that diversity indicates.

The worlding urge activates us, at least among those who have empathy, and this action/movement/bodying, it is this which creates the world, which helps us survive and do all that other stuff which transmits pro-tips between the generations and across our societies complex and diverse, spread out and concentrated, in cross-insurance and play.

1 Stephen Stich. “The Moral Domain: How Can We Specify the Boundaries of the Moral Domain? We Can’t Because the Moral Domain Does Not Exist.” Chapter 55 of Atlas of Moral Psychology, 547–55. New York: The Guilford Press, 2018.

I also have a follow-up on this reaction above in reference to its mention of the Expanding Circle.