Reaction to Richard Joyce's Evolution and Moral Naturalism
A list of reactions to other evolution~morality papers and chapters and stuff can be found at Reactions to papers on evolution~morality.
Joyce, Richard. “Evolution and Moral Naturalism.” The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism (Forthcoming). Wiley-Blackwell, 2016. via academia.edu. Web. ISBN9781118657607 [Chapter 26 pages 369-385]
This reaction is really just riffing on ‘moral naturalism’ more than the positions described in Joyce’s chapter, but does use some of the referents in the abstract.
ABSTRACT: Moral naturalism is the view that moral properties exist in a manner that fits with our scientific worldview. Might empirical discoveries about the genealogy of moral judgments (that, for example, they issue from an evolved psychological faculty) serve to undermine moral naturalism? One way of undermining moral naturalism is to show that moral properties do not exist at all. The possibility of genealogical considerations supporting this conclusion are examined and found to be weak. Alternatively, might empirical discoveries about the genealogy of moral judgments serve to vindicate some form of moral naturalism? This possibility is also explored and found to be unconvincing.
So beginning with the first line:
Moral naturalism is the view that moral properties exist in a manner that fits with our scientific worldview.
If moral properties are outcomes of some process (we uncover with a scientific set of investigations), then do these moral properties exist naturalistically or non-naturalistically? (Given that, assuming they are things that need explaining, if they are 'things', this does not mean they are hard objects —ontologically or logically).
For example, given that nurture is an outcome of evolutionary 'genealogies' we would call nurture a naturalism in that it is a natural outcome. However generally at this point we humans often begin to regard more derivative products as non-natural, i.e. the product of nurture, which are then, by definition, not natural, or. 'artificial', even if nurture is a natural outcome.
(naturalism being the view that something, or some part of that thing's taphonomy is natural)The question is where to draw the line, (in the frame of moral naturalism) for these later derivatives (moral properties) that makes any sense at all (if derivative then are they properties at all?). In effect we may end up looking for convergent or underlying commonalities as evidence for such positions, that they then can be regarded as (moral) properties. (Pulling a long bow.)
If the urge to judge is the primary motivation (to should the world), then the judgements made and criticised are secondary and contingent on contexts and the aforementioned genealogies (and not the schema we see in, say, game theory or religious ritual, rules and codes). I.E. moral properties share a moral grammar, or chare a common ancestor, but a language family does not form a universal language let alone an animalistic universal grammar (nor indeed a Platonic logical or formal universal grammar).
Moral naturalism is thus stuck in a sub-optimal outcome or pothole, which feels like the world to me.
At this point in the process, a taphonomical approach in an evolutionary framework might uncover the primary or originary urge (to should or to world the self) when looking at the derivative outcomes (moral judgement and their cultural contexts).
Such a framework makes a lot of moral philosophy the busy-ness of do-gooders looking for a compromise, not just for moral naturalism which begins to approach some sense on the matter compared to deontological posturing, which occludes the urge to should… —to world the self.
Sure there are moral properties, but they are derivative and ‘should not’ be accorded originary status or focus.
If empirical discoveries (for example by taphonomical reductions or deductions) support the view that moral properties are outcomes of an evolutionary process (or its derivative evolutionary processes), then it just means that nurturing is a natural outcome of evolution. Thus 'moral properties' (and more-so deontological frameworks) are not require to world, even if they allow metaphysical thickets to ramify through our contingent worldly ways forever.